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The aim of this paper is to analyze the causes and evaluate the
consequences of the rapid wage equalization between eastern and western
Germany following economic unification in 1990. The paper is divided into
four parts. In Part I, we first summarize the basic facts of the eastern
German labour market since economic unification as far as they are
relevant for the purpose at hand. We then critically evaluate a few
different theories, which have been advanced to explain the observed
rapid rise of the eastern real wage level in face of drastically increasing
unemployment. In particular, we shall discuss whether the observed facts
should be seen as the logical consequence of historically unique economic
circumstances (e.g. due to the high East/VVest-mobility of the labour
force or to the end-game characteristics of eastern German wage
bargaining), or whether they are better viewed as the 'natural' outcome
of German-style corporatism. In Part II, we shall evaluate some normative
economic arguments that have been advanced in favour of a rapid
East/West-wage equalization; particular emphasis will be put on matters
of interregional mobility, human capital accumulation, and the path of
structural change. In Part III, we shall sketch the likely long-term
consequences of the rapid wage equalization for the eastern German
labour markets. In Part IV, we shall draw some policy conclusions on
whether there are any policy alternatives to wage differentiation.
I. The Eastern German Labour Market
1. Stylized Facts
Since German economic unification in mid-1990, underemployment in
eastern Germany has reached and probably even surpassed the dimension
of the Great Depression in the early 1930s. .-. Table 1 gives a rough
quantitative picture of the various categories of open and hidden
unemployment as they developed in the three consecutive years 1990,
1991 and 1992. Before 1990, unemployment in the command economy of
the German Democratic Republic can safely be assumed to have been
negligible - though, of course, the employed labour force was heavily
Given the still poor state of the data on post-socialist eastern German
labour markets, our analysis shall be mostly descriptive, with no
attempt made to provide an econometric basis to our arguments.- 2 -
Table 1: Underemployment in Eastern Germany 1990-1992
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(6) work creation programmes
(7) requalification measures
(8) early retirement schemes
(9) unemployment rate U I
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(14) rate of labour partici-
pation LPI
(15) rate of labour partici-
pation LPII
16600 16215 15908 15702
59.4 55.2 52.7 50.3
59.4 54.7 50.9 48.1
Note: annual average of quarterly data (l)-(4), (6)-(8) and
(13) in '1000; (5) and (9)-(12), (14)-(15) in per cent;
net balance;
in per cent of normal working time; for 1992 estimated
by Sachverstandigenrat 11992/93], p. 101.
Defined as (2)/(I); in %.
Defined as [ (2)+(4) (5) ]/(1); in %. •
Defined as [ (2) + (4)(5) + (6) + (7)]/[(l)+(6) + (7)]; in %.
Defined as [ (2) + (4)(5) + (6) + (7) + (8)]/[ (l) + (6)+(7)+(8)];
in %.
Defined as (1) /(13); in %.
Defined as [(l)-(3)J/(13); in %.
Data Source: Institut fur Weltwirtschaft; Sachverstandigenrat [1992/93],
p. 101.- 3 -
underutilized on the job. From this starting-point of close to zero
per cent, the 'open' unemployment rate, i.e. the number of registered
unemployed persons divided by the labour force (unemployment rate U 1)
rose to a yearly average of 2. 7 per cent in 1990, 10. 9 per cent in 1991
and close to 15 per cent in 1992. Including short-time work in the
definition of unemployment (weighted by the average non-working time of
short-time workers), one obtains an adjusted unemployment rate U II,
which moved up much sharper than U I to 6. 6 per cent in 1990 and
21.7 per cent in 1991; it declined again thereafter to 17.3 per cent in
1992. However, this adjusted measure is still quite misleading: while the
sharp rise of short-time working practice in 1990 and 1991 rightly signals
a substitution of employment by a specific form of underemployment, the
even more drastic decline of this practice between 1991 and 1992 was
accompanied not by a massive rise of genuine employment, but a quite
substantial increase of the number of people in work creation
programmes, requalification measures and early retirement schemes.
Extending the definition of unemployment to include these supplementary
forms of 'hidden' unemployment - in the table U III covering people in
work creation and requalification programmes, U IV in addition covering
people in early retirement schemes - the picture is one of a sharp
increase of unemployment between 1990 and 1991 (from around 6-9 per
cent to 23-28 per cent) and roughly a stagnation between 1991 and
1992.
2
Although these extended measures U III and U IV do give a first
impression of the true magnitude of actual underemployment, they are to
be interpreted very cautiously because they still neglect important
catergories of joblessness in eastern Germany. At least two categories
stand out in importance. First, a significant part of the labour force in
Treuhand firms is still endangered because the respective plants are
2
Note that extending the definition of unemployment to include people in
requalification programmes and early retirment schemes also requires a
definition of the labour force to cover not only the persons in
employment (including those in work creation programmes and in
short-term work), - unemployed persons and the net balance of
East/West-commutors, but also persons in the requalification
programmes and early retirement schemes, which are usually not
counted as part of the labour force.- 4 -
highly subsidized and will have to close down eventually. At present,
there are still about half a million employees in Treuhand firms - 60 per
cent of them in industrial plants that are very hard to privatize or
restructure - and it would not be surprising if that would amount to a
further potenticil of 300,000 unemployed persons. Second, many
unemployed persons - notably female ones - have withdrawn from the
labour force into household work. In the labour market, they represent a
'reserve of discouraged workers', which goes well beyond the extent of
de-activation that typically happens in cyclical downturns in the West.
The fact that the rate of labour force participation - measured as the
share of the labour force in the population - has decreased from almost
60 per cent in 1989 to roughly 48-50 per cent in 1992 suggests that this
discouraged worker effect may be quite substantial. It is remarkable that
labour force participation in the East has already more or less reached
the lower western level - despite the probably better average educational
standards and labour market experience of women in the East.
At the same time, a rather broad measure of unemployment as U IV may
also be regarded as overstating the true dimension of joblessness because
it includes those persons, who have retired early and who are likely to
be removed from the labour force for good. On the other hand, the
massive use of early retirement has led to a decline of the average age
of the remaining employed labour force and thus reduced the scope for
the natural shrinkage of the labour force through age-induced exits in
the next decade or so. Thus, in the short run, early retirement may not
increase unemployment; in the medium and long run, however, it
deprives the labour market of a natural relief from the labour supply
side. Hence if one focuses on the medium and long run of market
absorption of surplus labour, then it makes- good sense to include
persons in early retirement schemes in the definition of unemployment
and the labour force. Taking all these speculative considerations into
account, it appears to be not unrealistic to assume that about 1/3 of the
eastern German labour force is today unemployed in one form or another.
See Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut fur
Weltwirtschaft 1993.A sectoral breakdown of the contraction of employment is given in
Table 2. It shows that, between the last quarter of 1989 and the fourth
quarter of 1992, there was a clearcut sectoral pattern in the magnitude
of the shrinkage: employment declined most sharply in agriculture and
forestry (-67.6'per cent) followed by industry (-48.9 per cent), trade
and transport (-27.7 per cent) and services in the narrow sense,
including government (-20.8 per cent). Due to its previously very high
share in total employment (44.6 per cent), the absolute decline was most
dramatic in industry, which released more than two million workers,
followed by agriculture (662,000); in turn, the decline in the service
sectors (in the broad sense) was relatively moderate. The intersectoral
pattern becomes even more accentuated, if one distinguishes three main
branches of industry, namely construction, energy (including mining)
and manufacturing: while employment in construction and energy
remained roughly constant, employment in manufacturing declined almost
as sharply as in agriculture.
Parallel to the dramatic contraction of employment, real wages rose
substantially. The first wave of collective agreements in major branches
of industry and services in summer 1990 generally fixed the contrcictual
minimum wage at around 50 per cent of the western level in the
4
respective branches, in construction even up to 72 per cent. As early
as spring 1991, most collective agreements stipulated a stepwise increase
of the contractual minimum wage up to 100 per cent of the western level
as of spring 1994. In terms of actual earnings, the rise of nominal and
real wages in the years 1990 and 1991 is portrayed in Table 3. Roughly
speaking, the monthly wage of an average industrial employee
(white and blue collar taken together) rose from around 30 per cent to
4
For details, see Sachverstandigenrat [1990/91], Tabelle 20, pp. 70-75.
5 For details, see Sachverstandigenrat [1991/92], Tabelle 32, pp. 112-115,
and [1992/93], Tabelle 30, pp. 107-110.
For 1990 and 1991, the data on eastern wages as compiled by the
Federal Statistical Office does not disaggregate according to white- or
blue-collar status in the comparative statistics for East and West,
because the dividing line between the two categories would have been
quite arbitrary in the early post-socieilist eastern economy.6 -
Table 2: Employment in Eastern Germany 1990/1-1990/IV
level (in '000) share (in Z) change 1989/IV - 1992/IV
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980 318 10.0 5.1
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transport 1651 1193 16.9 18.9
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government 2773 2195 28.4 34.9
work creation












Roman numbers refer to quarters.
Source: Own calculations from DIW, IfW [1993], Table 1, p. 4.- 7 -
































































Notes: W_ = Average gross monthly wages of blue and white collar
workers in the East (total industry); W /Ww = wage ratio East
to West in per cent; Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, FS 16,
Reihe 2. 1, various issues; P_ (P.-,) = price index of industrial
producer prices (price index of the cost of living) in the five
• Eastern Lander, 1989 = 100; Source: Statistisches Bundesamt,
FS 17, Reihe 3 and Wirtschaft und Statistik, various issues;
Wp/P (Wp/Pp) = real product wages (real consumption
wages), 4/1990 = 100. Due to missing data the real wages
indices for 4/1990 were calculated using the price indices for
5/1990.
Source: Burda, Funke [1992].- 8 -
about 50 per cent of the respective western level within less than two
years. Althouh no comparable data are yet available for later times, a
further rise up to about 65-70 per cent in the course of the year 1992 is
likely to have taken place. All over this period, the respective ratio of
hourly earnings is probably somewhat lower all throughout because
average working time in the East (excluding short-time work) has been
persistently higher than in the West, roughly by a margin of 5-10 per-
cent; however, there is no doubt that the sharp upward trend of nominal
wages relative to the West applies equally to all standard measures of
worker remuneration.
The rise of the eastern nominal wage translates into quite divergent
developments of the real wage, depending on whether nominal earnings
are deflated by the eastern producer price index, which declined sharply
in mid-1990 and remained roughly constant thereafter, and the consumer
price index, which rose continuously over the sample period covered in
the table. Thus the producer real wage shot up by more than 80 per
cent between May and July 1990 and by another 50 per cent in the
following months up to October 1990. In turn, the respective upward
adjustments of the consumer real wage were more moderate, about 24 per
cent and 11. 5 per cent respectively. Of course, given the statistical
difficulties of calculating price indices in an early post-socialist
environment, which is still characterized by heavily distorted prices and
thus widespread shortages in submarkets as still was the case in
East Germany in spring 1990, these calculations must be taken with more
than a grain of salt. Nevertheless, there can hardly be any doubt that
German economic unification in mid-1990 was accompanied by something
like a free fall of producer prices that ceteris paribus led to a dramatic
rise of the producer real wage. Equally, it is; undisputable that, from
mid-1990, both the producer real wage and the consumer real wage rose
quite continuously, and that the former did so considerably faster than
the latter.
Concerning the future prospects of eastern wage growth, the contents of
most collective agreements as of 1991 pointed to an equalization of
contractual minimum levels between West and East in most industries by
the year 1994. Most recently, major contracts have been renegotiated and
now envisage the respective wage equalization by 1996. However, this- 9 -
does not imply that actual earnings will be equalized by then as well.
This is so for two reasons. First, the contractual agreements cover the
core elements of remuneration only; many contractual fringe benefits
have not yet been negotiated to reach the western level in the near
future or have simply not been subject to collective bargaining at all.
Second, there is a persistent, cyclically rather stable 'layer' of
supercontractual payments in the West, which has mostly built up in the
time of overemployment in the 1960s and which has never melted away
since then. Obviously, there have not yet been any market forces which
could have helped to build up such a layer in the East as well. Hence,
even if - ceteris paribus - contractual minima were equalized by 1994, a
significant wage difference between West and East would remain. A
highly tentative guess based on the role of fringe benefits and
supercontractual payments in the West is that this residual difference
may remain in the range of 20 per cent by the mid-1990s, a number,
though, which should be treated with extreme caution.
So much for the basic labour market facts. The task of explaining and
interpreting these facts falls into two parts, one of them quite easy, the
other much more difficult and challenging. The easy part concerns the
explanation of the crisis itself: what were the forces at work in German
economic unification? What made it such a disastrous event for the labour
market? As these questions have been answered rather uniformly in the
literature we shall be rather brief on this matter. The difficult part
concerns the explanation of the coincidence of sharply rising
unemployment with rapidly rising wages: why did labour, notably unions,
push for fast wage increases in the face of dramatically worsening labour
market conditions in the East? What made them opt for an early wage
equalization between the 'old-capitalist' and the 'post-socialist' parts of
the economy? As these questions are much more controversial in the
literature, we shall try to answer them in somewhat more detail.
See, e.g., Akerlof et al. [1991]; Sinn, Sinn [1991]; Giersch, Paque,
Schmieding [1992], Chapter 6; Siebert [1992].- 10 -
2. The Causes of the Crisis
Briefly summarized, the breakdown of the East German labour market
may be described and interpreted as follows. With German unification in
mid-1990, the East German economy was subjected to a huge liberalization
shock, both internally and externally. Interncilly, the system of centrally
administered price setting, production controls, and trade management
was abolished in basically one stroke so that a completely new price
system and incentive structure in virtually all newly emerging markets
put heavy adjustment pressures on the factors of production. Externally,
the economy was stripped off its almost watertight system of protection,
which had kept it isolated from western capitalism; the opening up
further accentuated the adjustment pressures, especially in
manufacturing industries which were suddenly facing a fierce
international competition in their home markets. It is clear that this
once-for-all jump into a liberal market order was bound to lead to a
wholesale devaluation of all physical and human capital, or more
precisely: an immediate disclosure of the real value of all assets at world
market prices. Naturally, large parts of the capital stock - above all in
industries producing tradeable goods - was to become obsolete almost
over night at the prevailing wages, which were converted 1 : 1 from the
'soft' Ost-Mark into the 'hard' D-Mark and, as a consequence, a vast,
almost universal capital shortage emerged with the concomitant open or
hidden unemployment. On top of this, wages rose rapidly from their
original 1 : 1 D-Mark-level at the day of economic unification and thus
further worsened the extent of capital obsolescence and unemployment.
Except for the subsequent wage push, the 'core' of the crisis - not, of
course, its sheer size and its abruptness -. resembles the classical
'terms-of-trade'-crises that sunset industries in western Germany faced
in the mid-1970s and early 1980s: given the structure of world demand
and the extent of competition from abroad, domestic products could not
be sold at a price that covered at least short-run average cost. At a
given physical productivity of labour, the declining product prices
reduced the respective value productivity of labour at given employment.
Note that the terms-of-trade loss revealed through liberalization in
eastern Germany was probably even much more dramatic than the
roughly 30 per cent-decline visible in the statistics (Table 3) because- 11 -
that decline - and the subsequent stability - took place at rapidly
shrinking levels of production and employment, i. e. at a steeply
decreasing market supply of domestic goods. To soften the landing of the
liberalization in terms of employment, a very dramatic nominal wage cut
would have been necessary, of course much more dramatic than the often
quoted physical productivity differential between West and East. E.g., if
one assumes that the ratio of physical labour productivity between East
and West was somewhere between 1 : 2 and 1 : 3, a number often floated
in the public discussion at the time, and that this would have been the
guideline for the East/West-differential, then not all that much would
have been gained in terms of a softer landing: in fact, the actual
earnings differential up to late 1991 (see Table 3) was approximately in
this range, and nevertheless, the crisis took shape in its actual
disastrous dimension.
In view of this diagnosis, one can conclude that German economic
unification pushed the East German economy into a deep structural
supply-side crisis with a capital shortage of a previously unknown
Q
dimension. Some authors claim that, on top of this dramatic supply-side
crisis, there was also a lack of demand which severely aggravated the
emerging downturn. This lack of demand is mainly identified with the
immediate demand shift of eastern consumers away from 'shabby' eastern
consumption goods to the more fancy products manufactured in western
Germany, which took place as soon as the Easterners received 'hard'
D-Marks for their previously non-convertible East-Mark balances.
Although, of course, such a demand shift or preference revelation did
take place, it is in our view misleading to attribute anything more to a
genuine demand factor than a very short-run crisis in the consumer
goods industries. The rationale for our judgement is simple: only to the
extent that the East/West-preference shift was a strictly temporary
phenomenon which corrected itself as soon as the first glamour of
western products was fading away, one might speak of a temporary lack
Notably Franz [1991], and, to some extent, Akerlof et al. [1991].- 12 -
g
of demand for domestic, i.e. eastern consumer goods. To the extent
that the shift remained permanent, however, it was nothing else than
another indicator for the overall terms-of-trade loss of eastern industry:
given the price ratio of any two pair of substitutable East/West-goods at
the day of economic unification, there was an oversupply of the eastern
and an undersupply of the western good so that equilibrium could have
been restored only by a readjustment of this price ratio to the
disadvantage of the East, given the totality of characteristics (quality,
design etc. ) which the two products had. Thus the seeming lack of
demand, properly reinterpreted, boils down to another variant of
supply-side deficiencies of the eastern products. If one were to call any
such permanent preference shift a lack of (aggregate) demand, then one
would "altogether blur the distinction between demand and supply on the
macro level; in fact, this happens quite often in popular discussions of
the matter.
Apart from this conceptual argument against the lack-of-demand
interpretation of parts of the crisis, it is questionable on empirical
grounds how much the eastern German consumer goods industry really
suffered from such-like shifts. After all, the interindustrial pattern of
production decline shows consumption goods industries (except textiles)
and in particular the food industries to have experienced a much less
pronounced downturn in production than the investment goods industries
where demand shift effects due to preference revelation are unlikely to
have played a significant role. In fact, the pattern of production activity
after unification nicely confirms that the main determinants of the
strength of the downturn are to be found in the tradeability of the
respective products and their degree of genuine qualitative and
functional inferiority relative to the West; . thus investment goods
industries have in general experienced the sharpest contraction, much
sharper than on the one hand most basic materials industries (notable
exception: chemicals), which are often naturally protected by the high
9
Even then, one might argue that it is far from clear why this lack of
demand in the market for consumption goods should have translated
into a lack of aggregate demand, i. e. a decline of aggregate
absorption.- 13 -
transportation costs of their products and which are likely to have
disproportionally profited from the relatively early upturn in construction
activity, and much sharper than many consumption goods industries,
notably the food industry, where products are relatively homogenous so
that the East/West-difference in quality proved not very dramatic and
often ^easily curable through a simple repackaging and restyling
..... . 10
according to the new consumer preferences.
3. The Causes of the Eastern Wage Push
The really puzzling fact about the eastern German labour market is not
the extent of the emerging unemployment, but rather the immediate sharp
rise of nominal and real wages after economic unification and the
prospective contractual wage equalization between East and West by the
mid-1990s. Quite a few different attempts have been made in the
literature to explain this fact, most of them identifying some 'special'
historical circumstances that distinguished the eastern German situation
from that of a 'normal' labour market. In the academic and public debate,
there are four prominent explanations of this kind, which focus on
(a) the conditions of German monetary union, (b) the pressure of
East/West-migration, (c) the asymmetry of collective bargaining, i.e. the
strength of the unions and the weakness of employers, and (d) the
end-game characteristics of wage bargaining. We shall review and
critically evaluate these four non-exclusive explanations in the following
paragraphs.
(a) The Role of German Monetary Union
It has been argued notably before and right after German economic
unification that the 'generous' conversion rate of the formerly
non-convertible Ost-Mark into D-Mark of 1:1 (instead of, say, 1:2 or
1:3) would raise eastern labour costs to disastrously high levels and
For statistical details on the development of industrial production
from the second half of 1990 to December 1992, see Deutsches Institut




thus quite dramatically aggravate the labour market imbalance. This
argument is not plausible because it is based on assumptions about wage
bargaining that appear to be very unrealistic precisely for the specific
case of post-socialist eastern Germany. On theoretical grounds, a
different starting-level of the wage can only make a difference for the
outcome of subsequent wage bargaining if, roughly speaking, the subject
of collective agreements is the rate of change of the wage, not its level.
If it is the level alone, the mere establishing of a different starting-point
does per se not give a reason for a different outcome beyond the very
short run, i. e. the time span up to the first bargaining round. To be
sure, eastern Gernmn wage bargaining iifter economic unification has
been an almost classical example of bargaining about wage levels, not
relative wage increases, with the negotiated wage agreements usually
formulated as a share of the western level in the same industry or,
especially in the early bargaining rounds, as a fixed minimum DM-level;
at the same time the implicit percentage increases were hardly discussed
and went largely unnoticed in the public. This is altogether plausible:
from the very beginning, the public looked at eastern German wages
almost exclusively in terms of the eastern share of the western level, not
on the extent of marginal improvements that were to be achieved. Thus a
lower starting point would most likely have induced no more than a
12
sharper once-for-all upward shift in the first bargaining round.
For an academic statement along these lines, see Akerlof et al.
[1991], p. 64.
12
Note that, in such circumstances of almost complete calculation in
terms of an exogenous' wage standard ('the West'), even the
preservation of a seperate currency like, say, a convertible Ost-Mark
would by itself have changed very little; any exchange rate adjustment
would have been fully compensated by a corresponding opposite change
of the wage level in Ost-Mark so that the wage ratio East to West
would have remained roughly constant at the ratio agreed upon in
collective bargaining. Of course, assuming the survival of the
Ost-Mark alone is a purely hypothetical exercise because, if it had
happened, it is very likely that some forms of trade and mobility
restrictions would also have been preserved and that the institutional
merging of East and West would have been much slower than was in
fact the case. Given the political constraints of the time, it is doubtful
whether this was ever a realistic political option.- 15 -
Even if the conversion rate were accepted as an important determinant of
the early outcomes of wage bargaining after unification (say, the ones in
summer and fall 1990), it does in any case not help to explain why
- from this then collectively agreed base level - wages continued to rise
all throughout 1991, despite a clearly visible dramatic worsening of the
labour-market conditions. To repeat, the actual starting-level of the
eastern wage was around 1/3 of the western level in the early summer
1990 (see Table 3) - much too high to avoid a severe employment
contraction, but still way off parity so that a very substantial
inner-German wage difference could have been preserved even at this
stage. In fact, hardly anybody advocating a different conversion rate
made a case for a substanially larger wage differential than 1:3, which
roughly conformed to the East/West physical productivity differential
floated at the time. Hence, clearly, the major wage push took place
well after the establishment of German monetary union and at a time
when the extent of the employment contraction had become quite evident.
(b) The Pressure of East/West-Migration
By far the most widespread and popular view on the eastern wage push
is that it was a reaction to the pressure exerted by large parts of the
eastern German labour force which stood ready to move or in fact did
14
move to western Germany to find work there. In the light of the early
heavy waves of East/West-migration right after the opening of the
inner-German border, this view has some prima facie plausibility. On
closer inspection, however, it is not convincing at all: as a market
phenomenon, migration can only exert an upward pressure on the wage if
the labour force that moves or threatens to move is in fact a scarce
resource, not an abundant one. Roughly speaking, this happens
whenever the economy finds itself in a state of full employment. This has
That this differential was largely irrelevant for the labour market
has been argued above.
14
This view has been expressed in the public by many journalists and
politicians on numerous occasions. For an academic statement and a
formal analysis of it, see Burda, Funke [1992a], and Burda,
Wyplosz [1992], who also provide some statistics on East/West-migration
in the crucial year 1990 (p. 334).- 16 -
manifestly not been the case in eastern Germany since 1989 where
employers can hardly be assumed to have a strong incentive to pay
workers mobility premia to stay in the East simply because competition
for jobs on the labour supply side is so intense. If there were partial
scarcities in some segments of the labour market, i.e. for highly skilled
workers with excellent prospects of finding jobs in the West, then premia
might be paid in these particular segments, but not for the workforce at
large; given the high unemployment in virtually all labour market
segments of the eastern German economy in the last two to three years
- even among well-qualified workers - it is hard to see much market
rationale for any such selective premia.
It is important to realize that, if migration were the driving force behind
the prospective inner-German wage equalization, then collective
bargaining would only have a kind of passive role to play - just more or
less reproducing what market forces would have achieved anyway. Given
the very puzzle of fast real wage growth at dramatically rising
unemployment, such an interpretation of the facts looks close to absurd.
On the other hand, one might make a case for an indirect, non-market
impact of migration on union wage policy: with (western-)dominated
unions recognizing the threat of massive East/West-migration and its
consequent depressive effects on western wage levels, they put priority
on a rapid wage equalization to remove the economic rationale for the
migration streams. Plausible as it is on first glance, this argument
makes a very unrealistic implicit assumption, namely that unions
completely misjudged the economic rationale of the
East/West-movements. As all standard migration models recognize, it is
the expected income differential that matters for the migration decision of
-I O
the individual agent, not the actual wage differential. If a monopoly
union representing western labour interests and facing a
For a similar line of reasoning, see Akerlof et al. [1991], pp. 62-63.
For a formal analysis along these lines, see Burda, Funke [1992a].
1
7 See explicitly Burda, Funke [1992a], p. 17.
1 fi
See very clearly on this point, Meckl [1992].- 17 -
downward-sloping labour demand curve in the East takes this into
account, then wage equalization is obviously not an optimal strategy to
achieve the aim of minimizing the number of East/West-migrants. Instead,
in setting the eastern wage, the union has to weigh the expected decline
of the number of migrants from the pool of employed persons against the
expected increase of the number of migrants from the pool of unemployed
persons, which expands due to the agressive wage policy. Given an
elasticity of the labour demand function with respect to the real producer
wage in the empirically relevant range (say, around -1), it is then quite
unlikely that the union would choose a wage equalization as an optimal
strategy: anticipating that a large part of the eastern workers would be
pushed into unemployment, i. e. a state where they receive in the German
framework less than 70 per cent of their previous net wage (which at the
time was still no more than 50 per cent of the western level), a union,
which aims at minimizing migration flows from the labour supply side
would hardly opt for the actually observed pattern of sharp wage growth
in the East. Only if one assumed an implausibly thick veil of ignorance
on the union's side about the labour market consequences of wage
demands could one be hopeful to reconcile the observed wage growth
with a rationale anti-migration union policy. Then, however, the question
arises why the unions did not reverse their course as soon as the sheer
19 extent of the labour market crisis became visible.
(c) Asymmetry of Bargaining Power
It has been argued i. a. by Akerlof et al.[1991] that one major reason for
the sharp rise in wages was a kind of organizational asymmetry between
the labour and the employers' side at the bargaining table of all major
industrial branches: while labour was represented by the newly founded
eastern German wings of powerful and experienced western unions like,
e.g., the metal workers' union (IG Metall), most of the eastern managers
at the bargaining table were still survivors of the old regime whose
Note that our rejection of migration pressures as an explanation of
the rapid rise of eastern wages has no implications for the question
whether the prospective wage equalization did in fact help to curb the
East/West-migration flows, and if so, whether this was a good thing or
not. This matter will be delt with in Part II below.- 18 -
future professional destiny was largely independent of the actual outcome
of the wage negotiations. In these circumstances, the resistence of the
20 employers' side against wage demands was naturally very weak.
This -?argument is certainly correct in the sense that the wage
negotiations which took place were not genuine bargaining rounds with
parties that have at least partially conflicting aims. Nevertheless, the
argument somehow begs the question because it does not give a rationale
why unions should opt for wage equalization on their own: after all, in
standard monopoly union models, the wage is unilaterally determined in
an optimization by the union under the constraint of a labour demand
21 curve which then fixes the level of employment. Hence what the
argument says is that, basically, the situation of bargaining after
unification is best described by a monopoly union model, with employers
taking the union-set wage as given. However, this kind of model does
only predict sharp wage increases, if, in the relevant range, the labour
demand curve is quite inelastic so that there is in fact much scope for
the monopolistic union to appropriate rents. Thus one has to search for
reasons why labour demand as perceived by the unions is likely to have
been inelastic with respect to the real producer wage.
One obvious candidate to explain such a perceived lack of elasticity is
the extent of subsidization, i.e. the 'soft budget constraints' of eastern
22 firms: all along the time of the decisive wage bargaining rounds from
about summer 1990 to autumn 1991, virtually all firms of the state-owned
holding company, the Treuhand, were heavily subsidized to keep up
production and employment; most of the subsidies were paid out in the
form of liquidity grants so that, roughly speaking, the degree of
subsidization was directly linked to the extent of the losses made. As a
consequence, a very large part of the non-privatized firms in eastern
Germany was simply not pursuing a profit-maximizing calculus in any
meaningful sense so that, for the time being, there was certainly not
70
For details, see Akerlof et al. [1991], pp. 63-64.
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1 See, i.a. , Farber [1986].
See Burda, Funke [1992a] and Sinn, Sinn [1991].- 19 -
anything like a downward sloping labour demand curve resulting from
any such calculus. Although this was in fact the state of affairs at the
time of collective bargaining, it is much less clear how long this state of
heavy subsidization was expected to continue in the future, and whether
not, eventually - be it in the wake of privatization or in the course of a
restructuring as a publicly owned company - profit maximizing principles
with their consequences for the slope of the labour demand curve would
reemerge. A speculative assessment of the debate at the time would
almost certainly suggest that the state of affairs was widely perceived as
a temporary emergency, not as anything like a long-term equilibrium. In
fact, the already drastic rise of unemployment and short-time work in
the 15 months of decicive Wcige bargaining following economic unification
makes it quite implausible to assume that unions did actually not
recognize the growing unemployment risks for their clientele entailed in
an all too aggressive wage policy.
Other candidates than subsidization to explain a low real wage elasticity
of labour demand lead to the fourth hypothesis, namely that wage
bargaining had the characteristics of an end game.
(d) End Game Bargaining
So-called end game situations arise in wage bargaining whenever a firm
or an industry is clearly dying in the sense that there are no realistic
prospects of recovery under any feasible adjustment scheme. Prospective
investment in such a firm or industry will be zero whatever the level of
wages simply because there is already more capital engaged in production
than is actually needed. As a consequence, the long-run real wage
elasticity of labour demand will also be low so that it pays off for unions
to appropriate the quasi rents of the firm by raising the wage. ~ In a
way, the situation is the opposite to a soft budget constraint: precisely
23
For an exposition of a model along these lines, see Lawrence,
Lawrence [ 1985].- 20 -
because everybody knows that the firm will stop producing, labour has
24
an incentive to 'plunder' the remaining capital stock.
Though intriguing in its own right, this model does not properly
describe the eastern German situation either: while for many state-owned
eastern German firms, the market prospects were very bad indeed, there
were probably very few cases where it was clear from the beginning that
an eventual return to profitability was altogether impossible. By far most
of the firms found themselves somewhere between the prospect of
extinction and a more or less successful restructuring. In addition, the
wage at which bargaining started (say, 30 per cent of the western level)
was probably high enough to appropriate a large chunk of all quasi rents
25
of -existing firms so that any further increase would really just mean
'appropriating subsidies' for which case we are back at the question of
the likely duration of government support.
A more fundamental objection to the end game interpretation is that
collective agreements set wages not only for the existing firms, but - as
usual in Germany - also for all future firms of the respective industrial
branch, provided they are members of an employers' association. Thus,
analytically, the bargaining could never be of an isolated end game
character; rather it also fixed the conditions for future investments of
other firms in the same branch. If the employment effects of these
prospective future investments were taken into account in the union
monopoly calculus - and there is no reason why unions should have
disregarded them - then the end game model loses much of its appeal. To
be sure, the model appears to be much better designed to describe a
plant-level bargaining in the face of a prospective plant closure than
industry- or nation-wide bargaining which sets the conditions for
continued employment and/or reemployment of all relevant union members.
The end-game model has been proposed i. a. by Burda,
Funke [ 1992a, 1992b] to explain the peculiarities of the East German
labour market.
2
5 See Akerlof et al. , [1991], pp. 61-62.- 21 -
In a different context, however, a specific variant of the end game
interpretation may shed considerable light on the puzzle of sharply rising
wages. In view of the fact that large-scale lay-offs were expected to
happen in eastern Germany in any case, wage increases were a means to
secure higher benefit levels for the laid-off workforce in the prospective
spell of unemployment. As German unemployment benefits are calculated
as a share of the terminal net wage - roughly speaking 68 per cent for
the first year and 58 per cent thereafter - the wage increases did in
fact quite dramatically improve the 'entrance conditions' into the benefit
system. As unemployment benefits are regularly adjusted upwards
according to the rate of increase of the old-age insurance benefits,
which, in turn, are more or less indexed to the level of net wages, the
stepwise increase of the wage level was really a major move towards
opening the door to the welfare state for the eastern German labour
force.
Plausible as this welfare state variant of the end game interpretation
appears to be, it is very hard to speculate about its actual relevance.
Empirically, there is no direct clue in the facts and the data that could
help to determine how important these kinds of considerations were in
the back of union leaders' minds compared to the standard trade-off
between job security and income of the union membership. Two indirect
facts, though, may speak against an all too dominant role of them. First,
if they had been really dominant, then it would even be hard to explain
why unions agreed to stretch the adjustment process over a few years:
after all, the bulk of the prospective lay-offs was likely to happen in the
two years following economic unification which were still a time of an
East/West-wage ratio of generally below 60 per cent. Second, there was
no attempt made by unions to lobby for a temporary de-linking of the
level of unemployment benefits (together with old-age pensions) from the
general rise of wages: if the unions had simultaneously aimed at
improving the lot of those members, who unavoidably lost their jobs, and
of those, whose jobs were endangered by high wage rises, then a
generous provision of unemployment benefits at a more moderate pace of
wage growth would have been an attractive option. Under the special
circumstances of eastern Germany, another temporary deviation from
standard practices might have been accepted rather easily by the public
at large, not least if it had been coupled with a rise of old-age pensions- 22 -
because pensioners were generally regarded as the real losers of
.r. ..26 unification.
So much for the four major hypotheses that seek to find the explanation
for the eastern wage push in the particular historical circumstances of
German unification. All of them shed light on some peculiar economic
characteristics of the unification process, with the social end-game
interpretation having the lead in terms of plausibility. Taking an
intuitive view of the matter, however, it is hard to consider even a
combination of all four hypotheses as a satisfactory explanatory account
of the events. The main reason for this judgement lies in the almost
deterministic appearance of the path towards wage equalization. From the
very - beginning right after the currency union was established, wage
negotiations in the East seemed to be strangely unaffected by the
dramatic change of external conditions. All major wage rounds in
fall 1990 and in spring 1991. proceeded swiftly, without much public
controversy on their content and without much press coverage.
Remarkably enough, the partly parallel negotiations in the West received
much more public attention - thus indicating that the West was widely
regarded as the wage pacemaker for a united Germany and the East as
27
following suit in due course through East/West-wage equalization.
Apparently, it looked much less unusual to the general public than to
economists to see wages move up sharply in the face of rising
unemployment in the East. This raises the question whether the fact to
be explained was not so unusucil alter all; it may just as well have been
a logical consequence of an ever present deep-rooted union philosophy on
which wage policy was based for a long time and which was simply
applied again under somewhat extreme circumstances. In a sense, this is
26
Far-reaching special rules were applied to eastern Germany anyway
becuu.se laid off person;; in I lie Iva.'.t had never contributed to the
western insurance system during I heir time of employment.
97
Of course, this point can hardly be proven in an empirically rigorous
manner since it concerns general moods and attitudes in the
population, the political elite and the press rather than hard economic
facts. However, a glance through the press archives of the Kiel
Institute of World Economics on the relevant subject ('wages and
collective bargaining') and the relevant time span (1990-1992) confirms
the view expressed in the text.- 23 -
our interpretation of the matter, and we shall elaborate in the following
paragraphs how a rough explanatory account along these lines may look
like.
(e) Union Philosophy: The Principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work
CPEPEW)
Economically speaking, the tmsic rationale of unionism is to correct the
outcome of (free) labour markets in a way that is perceived as desirable
by union members. As to wage setting, the union task falls into two
different strands, an aggregate one - concerning the wage level and its
growth over time - and a structural one - concerning the wage structure
and its change over time. Taking a long-run perspective against the
reference system of a completely free labour market, the structural task
is probably the more fundamental one: after all, competitive forces will
tend to drive up the wage level roughly with the growth of labour
productivity, and to the probably large extent that unions' optimal wage
policy follows just the trend growth of labour productivity, the presence
of unions will not make much of a difference. Of course, unionism may
persistently keep the wage level above its equilibrium by exploiting some
monopoly market power, but there is no obvious point in assuming that
there is a systematic change of this 'monopoly mark-up' over time.
Things look different with respect to the wage structure, where market
forces do not necessarily pull in the same direction as union preferences:
if some structure is considered as 'fair' or in another sense advantageous
by the union membership, and if this structure is not established by the
market or is disturbed in a market-driven process of revaluation of
manpower and human capital, then there may be a persistent or a
recurring clash of the union task with market forces, which is not
'accommodated' by any common trend growth.
What matters for our purpose here is the regional element of the wage
structure, because the puzzle of East/West-wage equalization is defined
28
How large this monopoly mark-up happens to be empirically has been
the subject of extensive econometric research on American unionism.
For a survey of this literature, see Gregg Lewis [1986].- 24 -
in terms of a regional dimension. Looking over the experience of the last
four decades, it is clear that the broad pattern of the regional wage
structure has been remarkably stable and undifferentiated in West
Germany. This can be seen from Table 4, which depicts the average
hourly earnings of an industrial worker in the different German states in
ten-year intervals as a share of the West German average (in per cent).
All over the four decades, the differentiation was rather small - in the
range of a coefficient of variation between 2.7 and 7. 1 per cent
depending on the year chosen and on whether or not city states are
included in the sample. More importantly, the pattern of the inter-state
wage structure remained rather constant over time and it barely reacted
29 to specifically regional crises. Taking into account that most ot the
inter-state variation is likely to be due to differences in the composition
of industries - e.g. relatively high-capital intensity industries in
Northrhine-Westfalici compared to Bavaria or Schleswig-Holstein - then
one has to conclude that the West German economy experienced very
little regional wage differentiation and flexibility all along its history.
Hence the regional equilibrium structure of wages that survived for so
long should be interpreted as deliberately chosen by wage bargaining
and thus fully backed by what may be called an egalitarian preference of
the relevant industrial unions and the union umbrella organization.
In this sense, it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a long-standing
German union philosophy based on a principle of equal pay for equal
work ('PEPEW') which means that, whatever different market conditions
prevailed in different regions of West Germany, the same type of work
should be remunerated with the same wage. Given the regional structure
of union organization on the industry level, this principle has of course
never been explicitly formulated or made part of a programmatic
statement because this would have meant officially denying the
independence of the regional bargaining units. Apart from the factual
constancy and rigidity of the regional wage structure, the principle can
9Q
See Paque [1991].
This picture is roughly confirmed when a different wage variable is
used, namely the yearly gross income per employee (Table 4).- 25 -
Table 4: Regional Wage Level as a Share of West German Average
(in per cent)
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- non-city states 4.3
- all states 7.1


































































































































Standard deviation from unweighted average divided by unweighted
average (in per cent).
Source: Own calculations with data from Statistisches Bundesamt,
Bevolkerungsstruktur und Wirtschaftskraft (various issues);
Gemeinschaftsveroffentlichung der Statistischen Landesamter,
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Lander, Heft 9
(1960-76); and data provided by the Statistisches Landesamt
Schleswig-Holstein.- 26 -
only be inferred from the many programmatic union statements against
any kind of outsider 'wage dumping' under conditions of locally
concentrated economic crises: as any such outsider competition does
invariably have a strong regional dimension, the case against it implicitly
establishes a case against regional differentiation.
Why did German unions quite strictly adhere to the PEPEW in the past?
In our view, it would be rather farfetched to search for a rationality of
the PEPEW in the standard model world of wage bargaining, where unions
in a sense decide upon the short- or medium-run trade-off between the
likelihood of employment and the wage of some representative member. It
seems much more reasonable to search for the rationality of the PEPEW in
very long-term considerations of political economy and of group ethics.
Considerations of political economy creep in as soon as the government
can be anticipated by unions to stand ready to take over the
responsibility for the equality of living conditions all over the country
and to carry out a 'regional policy' that at least partly compensates for
the locational disadvantages of a specific region. If the government
commitment to such a stance is strong and credible enough, then it is a
reasonable strategy for unions to minimize the use of wage moderation as
an instrument to improve locational conditions for production and
investment in regions hit by crises and to leave the task to the
government. Prima facie, this seems to be a quite realistic description of
the basic regional policy assignment in West Germany: all over the last
four decades, the West German government had a rather strong
commitment to the use of instruments of regional policy to improve the
locational conditions in backward areas or in regions hit by industrial




See the sections on fiscal federalism (article 106-107), which
prescribe a redistribution of tax money to equalize living conditions
across the country, and the so-called common tasks of the Federal
State Government concerning the improvement of the regional economic
structure (article 91a). Note, however, that there is no explicit
constitutional responsibility for regional policy of the Federal
Government so that a federal drawback from regional policy would not
constitute an outright violation of the constitutional duties.- 27 -
As to group ethics, it is perfectly realistic to assume that the vast
majority of union members and even of the population at large would
subscribe to the moral postulate that an equal type of work should also
be paid equally in different locations, even if unemployment rates differ.
In fact, the PEPEW is so widely accepted as an abstract principle that
there has never really been a controversial discussion of it in the
32 public. Hence it is reasonable to inlerprel German unions as 'insurance
agencies' that, among other things, guaranty a 'fair' treatment of labour
across the country by making the same conditions of remuneration to
prevail everywhere. Of course, this does not mean that, under
circumstances of high regional unemployment, an individual unemployed
person may not be ready to work for conditions that he/she considers to
be unfair on moral grounds, simply because his/her personal destiny is
even more important to him/her than keeping up an accepted abstract
principle. However, it means, that ex ante, i.e. behind a kind of
Rawlsian veil of ignorance where he/she did not know his/her future
position in the labour market, he/she would prefer the PEPEW to prevail.
It is against this background of strong government commitment to
regional policy and an ethical consensus on the matter of equal pay for
equal work in different regions that the events following German
unification should be interpreted. In this light, unification did not mean
more than a redefinition of the geographical bounderies of the country in
which the PEPEW applies between regions; any deviation from the PEPEW
was regarded as an unusual and unsustainable state of affairs that had
to be corrected in due course. In a way, the burden of proof is thus
turned upside down: the sharp eastern wage increases are not any more
the extraordinary consequence to be explained by peculiar historical
circumstances, but rather the logical implication of a long-standing
practice of ensuring equal pay for equal work and of assigning the
32
Remarkably enough, the issue of interregional wage equality does
hardly receive any attention in a recent union-edited history of
unionism in Germany (Hemmer, Schmitz [1990]). In our view, this
simply shows that PEPEW has become a fact of life, which is taken for
granted rather than discussed controversially or preserved as an
important item on the union agenda for the future.
3
3 See Rawls [ 1971].- 28 -
responsibility to the government to carry out a compensatory regional
policy. As long as this practice was not questioned in principle, there is
no point in expecting anything else than a fast East/West-wage
equalization. Given the vast subsidization of the East right from the
start after unification, the unions had every reason to assume that the
government stood ready to carry out a large - in fact, a gigantic -
'regional' programme to support investment in the new eastern states.
Hence there was really no powerful counterveiling force which could have
driven unions to rethink their philosophy.
It is important to recognize that the actual union wage policy defies any
simple categorization as rational or non-rational in the sense of some
constrained optimization. Given the very high uncertainty about the
future economic developments, unions opted for preserving their role as
a guarantor of the PEPEW into the future. By doing so quickly and
decisively, they could create early facts and thus avoid to be drawn into
a quagmire of regional labour market responsibilities that might have
endangered their traditionally unambiguous egalitarian position. On the
other hand, they risked to worsen the regional labour market plight
beyond the point that the public would see it as a sole responsibility of
the government, and thus undermine their own position in the long run.
A similar combination of pros and cons of this strategy applies to the
support of the union members. On the positive side, unions could expect
to be seen as unyielding supporters of a widely accepted ethical principle
that, viewed from the perspective of western members, helped to
suppress 'unfair wage dumping'. On the negative side, the personal
interests of union members in the East were brushed aside: while they
34 shared the basic moral belief in the PEPEW, they were ready to trade
35
off this job security against the realization of an abstract principle. By
sacrificing a large number of union jobs in the East, the uncompromizing
wage policy could be seen as undermining union dominance in at least
34
See the results of opinion polls carried out by Akerlof et al. [1991],
which point to a majority of eastern employees regarding the payment
of a lower wage in the East for the same work by the same company as
a form of exploitation,
See again the opinion polls by Akerlof et al. [1991].- 29 -
part of the united country. At any rate, a difficult conflict for unions
between holding up important principles and risking to overdo the case
by overstretching government responsibilities and undermining the
membership base is clearly visible.
To sum up, the rapid wage push in eastern Germany after economic
unification should be viewed first of all as the natural consequence of
the interregional egalitariarism that collective agreements used to impose
on the wage structure all over the last four decades. In being
confronted with a regional crisis of so far unknown dimensions - both
with respect to the size of the area and the restructuring requirements
for industry - unions chose a strategy of 'business as usual' so as to
underline their traditional role as gueirantors of fairness principles and
the government's role as a source of regional support for investment.
Sticking to this strategy was made very attractive in the short run by
the historically unique circumstances of unification, notably the social
end-game situation resulting from imposing standard western welfare
state rules onto the new eastern states that started at much lower wage
levels. However, the driving force of the process is to be located in the
traditional structural rigidity of German-style corporatism.
II. A Normative Economic Case for East/West-Wage Equalization?
Prima facie, the vastly different unemployment rates in western and
eastern Germany speak for a substantial wage differentiation between the
two parts of the united country. In essence, it is the case of an
industrial crisis which has not been accommodated by a sufficient sectoral
wage moderation in the short and medium run and which has thus turned
into a long-term regional labour market disequilibrium, i.e. into a rise of
the natural rate of unemployment in the region previously hit by the
crisis. Given an insufficient mobility of the unemployed labour force, a
regional wage differentiation can help to make investment in the
respective region profitable enough to close the 'regional capita! gap' in
., , 36
the long run.
For a more detailed account of the case for regional wage flexibility,
see Paque [ 1991].- 30 -
In terms of normative economics, there are basically two strands of
argument that have been put forward against a long-term wage
differentiation between East and West. Both point to the detrimental
effects of such a differentiation on the long-term growth dynamics of the
eastern German economy. In doing so, however, they focus on different
issues, namely (a) the need to mitigate East/West-migration to avoid a
drain on the resources of the eastern economy, and (b) the need to
steer structural change in the direction of industries with a high labour
productivity, which is due either to a high physical capital- or a high
human capital-intensity of production. We shall critically evaluate these
two arguments in the following paragraphs.
(a) Meeting the Migration Threat
It is a popular view in the public that a massive East/West-migration in
the coming years would deprive the East German economy of its most
important long-term asset, namely a relatively well-qualified workforce,
and thus impede its future growth prospects. To prevent this from
happening, a rapid wage equalization is warranted.
In our opinion, this view is mistaken for essentially two reasons. First,
by identifiying the wage differential and not the difference in expected
incomes as the main empirically relevant motive for migration decisions, it
neglects the incipient rise of migration that is likely to result from the
rise of unemployment in the East as a consequence of wage
equalization. Second, by pleading for an across-the-bprd wage
equalization, it misses the superior option of a market-driven wage
equalization in those labour market segments where scarcities actually
emerge. E.g. , highly skilled workers may be paid supercontractual
premia so as to prevent them from moving to the West. Hence, if
anything, there is a case for a wage stratification between scarce (mostly
skilled) and abundant (mostly unskilled) labour in the East, with the
scarce part reaching western wage levels or even beyond (given the
better living conditions in the West!), and the abundant part lagging
See Section 1.3. (b) above.- 31 -
well behind. Such a policy of wage stratification would preserve the
eastern locational advantage of low-cost manpower and at the same time
prevent the outmigration of the complementary human capital. Compared
to this, a strategy of minimizing all kinds of East/-West-migration
irrespective of the labour market segment appears to be quite obviously
suboptimal on welfare economic grounds. Only if one introduces further
restrictions of fairness on the interpersonal wage differentiation within
the East - e.g. between skilled and unskilled workers - might an
East/West-wage equalization be justified as a second-best solution to
mitigate migration (if it were effective which it is probably not because
expected income diffeerentials, not wage differentials matter!). Then,
however, the real rationale for wage equalization is to be found in
38
considerations outside normative economics.
(b) Steering Structural Change
Among economists, the most common case against an East/West-wage
differentiation is based on the view that it would drive the eastern
German economy into a pattern of specialization with a higher labour
intensity of production and thus, at any given level of technological
knowledge in the united country, a lower labour productivity than the
western German economy. This prospect is judged to be undesirable
because the historical pattern of structural change has shown and the
future pattern is likely to show further that, in highly developed Central
Europe, there is no place for labour intensive production lines, mainly
because the growth potential lies in branches that produce with a
relatively high intensity of physical and/or of human capital, but not of
OQ
Burda, Wyplosz [ 1992] show within a model of the new growth theory
(e.g. in the spirit of Lucas [1988]) that an East/West-migration of the
skilled workforce could be desirable if only the extent of human capital
externalities is larger in the West than in the East due to, say,
agglomeration effects. While their basic point is valid, their analysis
starts from a policy-irrelevant framework of maximizing the present and
future output of East and West taken together. Thus, within their
model, massive migration flows of skilled labour from the East to the
West are not excluded a priori: a complete depopulation is within the
range of feasible and potentially desirable policy outcomes, partly even
calling for the subsidization of migration from the East to the West.
For a more detailed critique, see Paque [1992].- 32 -
manpower. This is why the course should be set early on in the
direction of the inevitable so as to avoid an untimely obsolescence of the
newly installed capital stock and a poor growth performance of young
eastern industries.
To evaluate this line of reasoning, we shall assume a simple model
economy with two geographically distinct regions ('West' and 'East'), two
homogenous factors of production (capital and labour) and a possibly
large number of sectors of economic cictivity ('branches') that are
characterized in the West by a large array of different capital intensities
and wage levels. Let us then assume that the old capital stock of the
East is completely obsolete for whatever reason so that the long-term
equilibrium structure of the eastern economy will solely depend on future
investments. Let us further assume that the prospective wage level in
the East is only a fraction - say, 2/3 - of the western level, but with
the same intersectoral wage structure between 'high'- and 'low'-capital
intensity sectors; hence, basically, labour in the East is simply devalued
across the board.
Within this setting, there are three channels through which the East will
end up with a high labour intensity of production. First, branches with
a high labour intensity of production will profit disproportionately from
the low labour costs in the East, and they will have the strongest
incentive to choose the East as a future location for investment and
production ('branch selection effect'). There may even emerge altogether
new branches in the East (e.g. in low-productivity services) that could
not profitably produce in the West at the prevailing wage level. Second,
in any single branch with a production technology that allows for a
substitution of labour for capital, firms will have an incentive to move to
higher labour intensities in the East than in the West, even without
switching technologies ('factor substitution effect'). Third, independent
of the production technology (whether substitutional or fixed
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An authorative statement of this kind can be found in
Sachverstandigenrat [1991/1992], §§538-542, notably §539 with
respect to the consequences of wage subsidies.- 33 -
coefficient), firms will tend to use technologies in the East that make a
more intensive use of the factor labour ('technology switch effect').
On the normative grounds of a future static efficiency of the allocation
between eastern and western Germany, it is very hard to argue against
any of these effects. After all, the East has. a stock of underemployed
labour that the West does not have, and it would be completely arbitrary
to take the western standard of labour intensity as anything like a
relevant normative yardstick for . the prospective eastern one.
Economically, eastern Germany is simply to be treated like another
country whose equilibrium wage level at the given migration propensity
of the population happens to be below the western German one. To be
sure, there have not been in the past any serious calls for a sharp rise
of the labour costs in, say, Austria, Belgium, Britain or Holland up to
the- western German level so as to remove the 'distortions' in these
economies. Although firms in these countries produce for roughly the
same international goods markets as West German firms, there is
apparently a different equilibrium structure of production, factor use
and technology application that cannot sensibly be criticized as inefficient
only because it takes account of the specific national, regional or local
conditions of the labour market. Without introducing non-economic
considerations and restrictions, the same is to apply to the eastern
German industrial structure once it will have developed on the basis of a
wage level that is persistently lower than the West German one.
Note that the same conclusions apply even if one thinks of labour not
being a homogenous production factor that is abundant, but of different
types of labour ('skilled' versus 'unskilled') with different degrees of
scarcity due to different labour market options, in case of migration to
the West. If the future eastern German industry would tend to produce
with a relatively low intensity of physical capital and skilled labour for
the three reasons given above, this would have to be considered as an
efficient reaction to genuine scarcities, not as a distortion away from the
'appropriate' factor proportions given in the West.
On the grounds of dynamic efficiency, it is widely believed that a higher
labour intensity of production would deteriorate growth prospects for the
eastern economy in the long run so that the prospect of convergence of- 34 -
per capita incomes between East and West would be further postponed
into the future. To evaluate this argument, it is convenient to
distinguish between two variants of it, the physical capital- and the
human capital-version. The former interprets high labour intensity as
meaning a relatively low average ratio of physical capital to labour, the
latter takes it to mean above all a low human capital intensity of
production, i.e. roughly speaking, a low ratio of skilled to unskilled
labour.
The physical capital-version of the argument is quite obviously
unconvincing. To see this, let us again distinguish the three different
effects that lead to a lower aggregate capital intensity: branch selection,
factor substitution, and technology switching. As to branch selection,
the empirical picture of the past does not confirm the view that branches
with higher capital intensities of production are the ones which tend to
grow faster. If anything, the reverse holds: most of the sunset
industries of the 1970s and 1980s in West Germany - notably iron and
steel, mining, shipbuilding etc. - are branches which produce with a
high capital intensity and a high physical labour productivity and which
tranditionally pay relatively high wages. As a consequence, the
geographical growth centers have typically not been regions where these
high wage-industries are concentrated - say, Northrhine-Westfalia, the
Saar, the northern coastal shore - but rather those areas like Southern
Bavaria, Baden-Wiirttemberg or Hesse where other industrial or service
activities are located. Of course, it is very hard to make a forecast
whether this trend will continue in the future because this would require
a more or less accurate prediction of the sectoral incidence of the supply
side shocks to come. However, it appears to be plausible to assume that
producers in newly industrialized countries and increasingly also in
developing countries will be able to compete in those high-capital
40 intensity production lines that use standard technologies.
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This has been a long-standing prediction of 'structural reports' of
the German economic research institutes. See, e.g., Donges, Schmidt
et al. [1988].- 35 -
As far as the factor substitution effect is concerned, the argument has
hardly any basis at all: the mere profitable employment of some more
lower-paid workers at the same capital stock and level of technology at
any point in time does not give any reason for a change of the long-term
productivity growth prospects. An analogous case can be made with
respect to technology switching: if the use of a more' labour intensive
technology becomes profitable precisely because labour is relatively
abundant, this has no identifyable implications for the future growth of
41 the respective branch.
The human capital-version of the argument is the much more interesting
one and it deserves some closer examination. Empirically, there is
substantial evidence that those sectors which produce with a high
intensity of human capital, had a better growth performance than the
average in the last two decades in West Germany; and, as in the case of
high physical capital intensity, there is hardly any reason why the
42
future path of structural change should be different in this respect.
The normative consequences of this likely prospect for an East/West-wage
41
All this seems so obvious that the question arises why, in the public
and in the political discussion, the link between (physical) capital
intensity and the growth prospects seems to be taken for granted.
Probably, there are two major reasons for this. First, observers tend
to confuse the ever present trend towards capital intensification in the
growth process with the choice of an appropriate capital intensity as a
starting-point of this process. Clearly, economies may have very
different average capital intensities, but they may all more or less go
through the same process of capital intensification over time in all
relevant branches of economic activity. The question at hand is clearly
one to fit the eastern German economy into the right slot of capital
intensity, with no apparent implication for the future performance in
the growth race. To put it bluntly, the question is whether eastern
Germany should follow the 'example' of western Germany or of another
European country with somewhat lower value added per working hour
in its economy (say, Austria, Belgium, Britain). Second, observers
tend to somehow 'define' the labour abundance in eastern Germany as a
strictly temporary phenomenon so that any pattern of specialization
which reduces this abundance is almost by definition wrong-headed.
Such a view simply assumes that there are other feasible and possibly
superior ways to reach full empoloyment than via a lower wage in the
East. We shall return to this matter below in the text when evaluating
the current set of policy measures to support the eastern German
economy.
4?
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differentiation in Germany crucially depend on the types of labour in
question: if the wage differentiation is uniform for both skilled labour
(as a proxy for human capital) and unskilled labour (as a proxy for
pure manpower), the relative price of human capital to manpower will be
the same in both parts of the country so that no distortion of factor use
in favour of manpower should be expected in the East. However, to the
extent that the East/West-differentiation is more pronounced for unskilled
than for skilled labour, which may have better prospects of employment
in the West, then some such distortion will come about. It is an open
empirical question to which human capital intensity the economy will
converge, because future migration flows and threats are -very hard to
predict. A rough guess is that human capital will be somewhat scarcer in
the East than manpower, but that - for a long time to come - there will
remain a large-scale unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour.
Hence the .-resulting downward bias of human capital intensity and the
concomitant loss of growth potential may not be all that dramatic.
Even if one were ready to accept the rationale for a corrective measure
to raise the future human-capital intensity of production in the East,
a 'policy' of general rapid East/West-wage equalization would hardly be a
first-best solution. In fact, if the policy aim were, roughly speaking, to
reach full employment of both skilled and unskilled labour and a maximum
speed of income convergence through essentially market-driven growth
processes between West and East, a policy of preserving a
market-determined East/West-wage differential for unskilled labour and
paying wage subsidies for skilled labour that just neutralized the
market-determined wage differential between the two types of labour,
would be preferable to an East/West-wage equalization across the board.
Up to this point, we interpreted the human capital version of the
argument as concerning the future pattern of specialization at a given
supply of manpower and human capital. There is another strand of
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thought based on ideas of endogenous growth theory, which focuses on
the role of a high-wage level as a device to raise the profitability of
4
3 Notably Lucas [1988] and Sala-i-Martin [1990].- 37 -
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investment in human capital. The rationale of this argument is very
simple: within a standard model of optimization of human capital
investment by a representative individual household, it can be shown
that - ceteris paribus - a higher wage involves a higher shadow value of
human capital, which, in turn, makes for a greater incentive to invest
time in costly training, both on the job and in unemployment. Hence,
while a wage rise increases unemployment in the short and medium run
45 through the standard labour demand effects, the greater incentive for
human capital investment accelerates human capital formation and thus
labour productivity growth. Under a set of additional assumptions, the
model implies that a large part of an original wage increase thus
'validates itself in the subsequent endogenous improvement of labour
productivity.
Without going into any details of this model type, there are some major
objections to its use as a standard of judgement and policy guide in the
case of eastern Germany or any other economy in a similar constellation.
First, the theory does not make an explicit distinction between training
on the job and training in unemployment, at least not in the form
presented by Burda, Funke [1992b]. In fact, it is assumed that both
kinds of training incur the same training costs and lead to the same
productivity enhancing effects, which is probably quite unrealistic.
Instead, it is likely, that, for many industrial jobs, training on-the-job
is the much more effective method to acquire skills than some publicly
financed requalification programmes that cannot be targeted precisely
enough at the future labour market needs. While appropriate model
variations to take account of this difference may be technically feasible.
they would somehow run counter to the whole philosophy of the
approach: after all, the more the process of training presupposes the
state of employment in the first place, the less the idea of a positive
long-run effect of the wage increase on growth as put against the
negative short-run effect on employment can be upheld.
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See Burda, Funke [1992b].
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In the model of Burda, Funke [1992b], it is assumed that employment.
is labour demand constrained in the relevant range.- 38 -
Second, it is doubtful whether the state of human capital is really
anything close to a relevant constraint on employment and growth in
present-day eastern Germany. Sure enough, there is a widespread
consensus among economists that the eastern German labour force has in
general a rather high level of qualification: in terms of formal education,
it is not much worse than the labour force in the West, and the still
existing gap in expertise with modern technical equipment is perceived to
be relatively small. What matters for future employment and growth are
apparently much more the general locational conditions than a lack of
human capital, which makes the situation of eastern Germany quite
46 different from that of a developing or a newly industrialized country.
Third, if human capital became a constraint in eastern Germany in a free
market wage regime with a relatively low wage level, then a market-
determined wage differentiation between skilled and unskilled labour may
do the job of providing the required retraining incentives. Beyond that,
there is no need for a general rise of wages; in fact, the wage
differentiation is preferable to the (probably large) extent that
training-on-the-job is the more effective and cheaper method of human
capital accumulation than requalification in unemployment (see above).
Finally, while theoretically sound in terms of abstract optimization, the
argument lacks an empirical fixpoint which could give at least a clue,
where the appropriate wage level could be located to initiate an
intertemporally optimal growth process. To put the problem in the form
of a straight policy question: how far is one to deviate from the
traditional fixpoint of full employment to speed up human capital
formation? On intuitive grounds, an argument of this kind might possibly
justify a surpassing of the full employment benchmark by, say, up to
5 per cent of the labour force for a few years; the dimensions of eastern
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Burda, Funke [ 1992b] quote the case of Singapore in the 1980s as an
example for a human capital oriented policy via high wages. For
different accounts of the Singapore experience, see Fischer, Spinanger
[1986], Suhr [1989] and Chadha [1991].- 39 -
German unemployment (around 30 per cent), however, appear to be well
47 beyond the plausible scope for any such policy advice.
All in all, the argument for speeding up human capital accumulation
through an agressive wage policy looks rather farfetched when applied to
the actual case of eastern Germany. It appears to be a mere ad-hoc
rationalization of an observed development, which would never have been
recommended as sensible policy in the first place. Remarkably enough,
no such policy has been proposed for the economy of the Czech
Republic, which, in many respects, started off from very similar
conditions in terms of factor endowment and industrial structure as
eastern Germany.
In a^more general sense, the aura of ad-hoc rationalization of an
observed fact surrounds all normative economic cases for a rapid
inner-German East/West-wage equalization, simply because the very fact
to be justified is so obviously dependent on the legalistic, not the
economic preconditions created by the nation state: if history had taken
a different turn after the iron curtain had come down and the two
Germanies had remained separate nation states with market economies
- say, with free goods and factor mobility between them within the
European Community - it is very hard to imagine that any economist
would have recommended to equalize the wage levels between the two
Germanies as soon as possible, be it on the grounds of 'excessive'
migration or of the future path of structural change. After all, there has
never really been a serious discussion on abruptly raising the wage
levels in, say, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom
or, more recently, the post-socialist eastern European countries to the
high (western) German level. If this is so, however, then one may well
ask, whether in the last resort all normative economic considerations are
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This is why the often-made reference to wage policy in Singapore in
the 1980s as an example for this kind of policy is misleading. After all,
Singapore had never to cope with unemployment levels in the range of
the eastern German labour mcirket.
For a comparison of the two cases, see Burcla [1991].- 40 -
no more than instruments to give some moral or legal considerations an
intellectually attractive underpinning.
III. The Long-term Consequences of East/West-Wage Equalization
For a number of reasons, it is very hard to make a sensible prediction
or even guess of the long-term consequences of East/West-wage
equalization for the labour market in Germany, both in the eastern and
in the western part of the country. First, despite the analytical parallels
to previous experiences in the West, the sheer extent of the adjustment
crisis in the East makes anything beyond the drawing of some vague
analogies and comparisons look extremely speculative. Second, the time
span in which the eastern German economy could be observed working
under essentially market conditions is very short by any standard of
statistical inference, at least as far as the identification of fundamental
long-term forces is concerned. Hence any form of extrapolation of trends
based on whatever constant parameters appears to be excluded from the
start. Third, given the vast extent of public subsidization of the East
through various channels, the final outcome of the transformation process
will be highly conditional on whether government policy will remain
essentially unchanged or whether public aid will be turned back and/or
adjusted in structure in due course.
For these reasons, all what is said in this section will have to be
regarded as no more than a conditional scenario on the general course or
direction in which the German labour market is likely to turn provided
that the general policy setting retrains, stable or changes in the way
indicated. To have a suitable starting-point for this speculative type of
analysis, we shall first stake out how the present policy framework looks
like.
With economic and political unification, the German government initiated a
vast array of programmes to support the transformation of the eastern
German economy from a command to a market system. Roughly speaking,
the policy package consisted of four items, namely (i) large-scale
liquidity grants to loss-making firms, notably to the state-owned
Treuhand-companies, (ii) heavy public investments in the physical, legal
and administrative infrastructure of the East, (iii) the extensive use of- 41 -
labour market programmes, above all work creation and requalif ication
measures, and (iv) the massive subsidization of private investment in the
East in the form of investment bonuses, special depreciation allowances
49 and cheap credit facilities.
In a longer-run perspective, the first three items are very unlikely to
play any major and persistent role, either because they are by their
very nature short-term emergency measures or because their rationale
will disappear anyway.
Liquidity grants are obviously emergency measures to prevent the
large-scale closing down of loss-making public firms in the interim period
until privatization takes place. The original political intention was to cut
off liquidity aid as soon as the bulk of privatization was completed,
which should be the case by the mid-1990s at the kitest. Despite the
actually high privatization speed of the Treuhand, it looks by now vary
likely that a non-negligible share of unsaleable industrial capacity will
remain subsidized for a long time, maybe in the form of state holding
companies, which will be publicly funded to prevent a complete
destruction of so-called industrial core regions. In many respects, this
will resemble the persistent subsidization of sunset branches like coal
mining and agriculture in the West, and it will create considerable fiscal
problems for the public budgets. However, given the already dramatic
shrinkage of employment in eastern industry up to now, it will probably
not affect the general development of the labour market to any
substantial degree - apart from cidding ci certain amount of hidden
unemployment to the empirical picture.
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For a survey of the main investment aid programmes, see Deutsches
Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Institut fur VVeltwirtschaft an
der Universitat Kiel [1991b], pp. 30-31. A regular stocktaking of the
state of the eastern economy and of the various policy measures is
provided by Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin,
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel, see [ 1991a, b, c, d;
1992a, b,c; 1993].
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Public infrastructure investments and labour market programmes have in
common that they aim at improving the locational conditions for private
investment in the East by improving the quality of the complementary
factor supply, namely the public capital stock and the labour force.
Given the present massive use of these instruments, it is likely that, in
a few years' Lime, they will simply loose their rationale because the major
visible Hast./VWIKI • gups in public capital slocks and the level of training,
and education of the labour force will be all but closed.
For these reasons, it appears to be quite likely that the most pervasive
and persistent instrument to be used in the long run will be the
subsidization of private investment in the East to compensate for
whatever locational disadvantages remain in the future at basically
minimum wage parity between East and. West. At present, a rough guess
is that, on average, the rate of subsidization for any D-Mark invested in
52 eastern Germany is around 30 per cent. As it is hard to imagine a
market economy to subsidize investment in roughly 1/4 of its territory at
such a high rate over a longer period of time, one may think of this
30 per cent as a higher benchmark for the future. Whatever the actual
rate may be, however, investment subsidization will probably remain the
most important single aid instrument simply because it is a classical
means to neutralize those locational disadvantages which cannot easily be
removed because they are either nature-given (such as geographical
location) or simply not known with any degree of precision (such as the
lack of agglomeration externalities which typically accrue in established
regional growth centers, but do not emerge outside of them). Therefore,
Note that, in the realm of labour market, programmes, this holds
above all for (re-Qualification schemes and to a lesser extent for work
creation measures (provided they have a positive effect on the quality
of the workforce, e.g. by keeping up motivation and work skills). It
does not hold for mere rationing devices such as early retirement
schemes, which have more the character of emergency measures to
remove a part of the labour supply from the market according to
whatever criteria. The heavy use of such-like rationing in eastern
Germany in the last two years will hardly be repeatable in the future
simply because there is not much scope left for a further rejuvenation
of the labour force.
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Private conversation with Klaus-Dieter Schmidt, Kiel Institute of
World Economics.- 43 -
it seems to be quite realistic to assume that a generous package of
programmes of investment aid for the East will survive, maybe coupled
with some more marginal labour market programmes and public investment
projects. What will then the future of the East German labour market
look like?
Disregarding for the moment the impact of massive subsidization of
private investment in the East, the long-term consequences of rapid
East/West-wage equalization for the eastern labour market are likely to
be qualitatively similar to the labour market dualization observed after
the severe industrial crises in the West, notably in the Ruhr and the
Saar area. The outcome will probably be a stock of long-term unemployed
persons - among them a disproportionate share of former industrial
workers and persons with structural handicaps such as age, poor health,
or to some extent lack of occupational training. They will find themselves
in basically the same situation as western ones in the aftermath of the
crises 1974/75 and 1981/83 and possibly also in the future after the
recession 1992/93: with the post-socialist shrinking of industry being
irreversible due to the high level of industrial wages in the East, the
labour surplus would have to be absorbed by other sectors of the
eastern economy, notably by the private service sector. However, jobs
in the 'professional' part of the service sector - banking, insurance,
consulting etc. - are beyond the level and structure of skills of basically
industrial workers. Only low-productivity and low-wage service sectors-
are genuine alternatives for them. Again, however, a ratchet effect of
the unemployment benefit system then comes into play, though in a
slightly different way than traditionally in the West. There, it was above
all the linkage between (open-)ended unemployment benefits and the
'historical' value of the industrial workers' human capital as expressed
by the actual earnings received before the lay-off that made unemployed
persons reluctant to accept significantly lower paid jobs. In other- words:
by the v^ry fact of de-industrtali/at ion, industrial workers' human
capital was devalued down to the level of their alternative employment
under market conditions. Today, in eastern Germany, the situation is
typically different in the sense that the lay-offs take place in a kind of
social end-game situation as described above: due to the extremely rapid
rise of the eastern wage level, most industrial workers still earn
substantially lower wages at the time of the lay-off than they might earn- 44 -
in a low-productivity service job at a later time of reentering
employment. Nevertheless, as unemployment benefits are regularly
adjusted upwards according to the rate of increase of old-age insurance
benefits, which in turn are more or less indexed to the level of net
wages, the 'gap' between the wage in an industrial and in a
low-productivity service job does not necessarily shrink over time. In
fact, this gap is likely to have
( remained more or less constant in eastern
Germany since both the net wage and old-age pensions so far grew at
about the same rate since unification - reaching 60 to 70 per cent of the
western level by the end of 1992.
By and large, this is again the picture of a dual labour market that will
emerge in \he East in the 1990s just as it did in the West in the course
of the later 1970s and 1980s, with a high-productivity industry which is
too small to absorb the former industrial labour, and large-scale
structural long-term unemployment. In quantitative terms, however, the
situation will be much more dramatic than ever in the West. Given the
post-crisis levels of unemployment to start from about 1/3 of the labour
force, the eventual equilibrium levels of unemployment to which the
eastern economy will converge are likely to be well above 20 per cent,
depending on the particular regions in question, with the southern states
having somewhat better locational conditions than the northern ones.
Taking now into account the likely impact of massive subsidization of
investment in the East, the picture described above must be adjusted in
two qualitative respects. First, the level of unemployment will be
somewhat lower: whatever they do else, investment subsidies that are
basically financed by western taxpayers', money will raise the rate of
return to capital in the East and thus redirect investment from the West
to the East as well as incite capital formation in the East itself. Other
things being equal, this will create additional employment and thus
mitigate the labour market problems. To what extent this will be the case
is an empirical question that can hardly be answered at present. It all
crucially depends on how serious the remaining disadvantages of the East
as a location for industry happen to be in the future compared to the
subsidization offered. Given the rather disappointing investment record
in the East so far, there is reason to be sceptical in this respect.- 45 -
Second, the dualization of the labour market will be further accentuated
by the type of aid, which involves a constant rate of subsidization for
any D-Mark invested, but a rate of subsidization per job created that
declines with the capital intensity of production. Hence, capital intensive
lines of production will profit disproportionate from the subsidization -
thus leading on average to a higher capital intensity of production via
the three effects ('branch selection', 'factor substitution', 'technology
switch') that have been described in an analogous situation, but under
opposite signs above. Again, the likely effect is impossible to quantify,
but at the prevailing high rates of subsidization (around 30 per cent), it
may be quite substantial. Note that, unlike the 'bias' towards labour
intensity in case of a long-term East/West-wage differential, the capital
intensification as a consequence of investment subsidies must be viewed
as a genuine allocative distortion because, in terms of factor intensities
in the East, it drives structural change into precisely the direction that
is not warranted by the prevailing factor endowments.
All in all, eastern Germany will thus experience a replay of the dual
economy that emerged in the western regions where the sunset industries
of the 1970s and 1980s were concentrated. Due to the sheer extent of the
de-industrialization and the type of the subsequent investment aid,
however, the dualization will be much) more pronounced than formerly in
the West. Whereas, even in the worst-hit western areas, the equilibrium
unemployment rate never surpassed 15-20 per cent, it may well remain in
the range of 25-30 per cent in the East.
Taking a very long-run view, such dimensions of persistent
unemployment in a substantial part of the united German economy, which
covers roughly 1/5 of the whole labour force, may have quite
revolutionary feed-back effects on the viability of long-standing
institutions of collective bargaining. On ci very speculative level, one
may doubt whether collective wcigu agreements that are factually (not
necessarily legally) binding for all market, participants can .survive at
equilibrium unemployment rates of 25-35 per cent.
The rationale for these doubts lies in a rough comparison of the power of
outsider competition between the West German situation in the wake of
industrial crises in the 1970s and the 1980s and the eastern German one- 46 -
in the future. In western Germany, outsider competition for jobs always
remained a fringe phenomenon: after an industrial crisis had run its
course, most workers were rather easily reintegrated so that the
remaining pool of unemployed persons was of rather bad quality because
a large part of this pool consisted of structurally handicapped workers.
Therefore, it was hardly a promising option for existing firms to leave
their respective employers' associations and risk discontent and
demotivation within the insider workforce only to tap the marginal pool of
unemployed persons. Similarly, newly founded industrial firms that were
to build up a high-quality workforce, could not simply by-pass the
insider workforce of the economy as represented in collective bargaining
by unions and employ just outsiders at subcontractual levels. Thus even
without a watertight legal enforcement ol contractual terms for outsiders
- after all, the weapon of declaring collective agreements generally
binding was rarely used - the institution of collective bargaining proved
basically stable, despite less than full employment. In a way, it was
precisely the strong structural element in unemployment, i. e. the
relatively high share of how ever structurally handicapped persons, that
stabilized the system by backing unions' bargaining position as
representatives of insider interests.
In eastern Germany, the situation is likely to be the same in the basic
genesis of persistent unemployment, but not in its extent and therefore
probably also not in its structured characteristics. At rates of
unemployment in the range of 30 per cent, the share of structurally
handicapped persons (high age, impaired health, lack of qualification
etc. ) will be much lower and thus the remaining pool of high-quality
unemployed persons much larger than it ever was in the West. For firms,
this will make for a very high opportunity cost of membership in an
employers' association: being organized will mean foregoing all advantages
of tapping the high-quality pool of unemployed persons which, in many
regions, may be large enough to simply by-pass unions altogether
without jeopardizing the prospect for building up a high-quality
workforce on the plant level. While it is, of course, pure speculation to
name a threshold level of unemployment above which a collective
bargaining system may become unattractive for industrial employers,
jobless rates of 25-30 per cent should be well above any such level.- 47 -
Thus, through the backdoor of outsider competition, the traditional
German-style bargaining system may be threatened in the long run.
If such a threat becomes visible in the future, it is of course an open
question how the Federal Government will react to any calls for
broadening the basis of application for contractual terms. Within the
prevailing legal framework, declaring an agreement generally binding
might even become close to impossible in legal and political practice:
legally, the requirement that 50 per cent of all employees in the
respective branch and region must be employed by contractually-bound
firms, may become difficult to meet because many new firms in the East
may\ stay out of employers' associations in the first place so that the
density rate of organization may be very low from the start; politically,
a Federal Government facing unemployment rates of 25-30 per cent in the
East may be quite reluctant to make any regulatory moves that might
endanger a long-awaited recovery in the eastern labour market.
In the very long run, a gradual undermining of traditional corporatist
institutions in the East is quite likely to have feed-back effects on the
West as well: with collective bargaining becoming less relevant in the
East, the subcontractual competition may just as well spill' over to the
West through the standard channels of substitution. Thus, in the end,
collective bargaining may become a fringe phenomenon in the whole of
Germany, with the regional wage structure and the wage level gradually
making its way towards equilibrium. Of course, all this is speculation,
but in view of the dramatic dimension of the labour market plight in the
East, it seems to be not implausible. Given the general trend to more
flexible working arrangements, which is closely connected to the
structural change away from smokestack to modern industries and from
54 industry to services, the development in the East might give a final
blow to the power of unions and employers' associations.
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IV. Policy Alternatives to Wage Differentiation?
It has been argued above that the unemployment gap between eastern
and western Germany calls for a wage differentiation to allow for an
appropriate East/West-gap in labour costs, which sets in motion various
mechanisms to bring the eastern labour market back into equilibrium.
Standard counterarguments were discussed and rejected at that point.
From the policy standpoint developed above, it should be immediately
clear that any measures to achieve such a labour cost differential by
whatever policy instrument is likely to be preferable in its long-run
labour market effect to the present system of almost exclusive capital
Asubidization that fosters a dualization of the eastern economy into a
~ modern capital-intensive segment paying high wages on one side and a
stock of long-term unemployed persons on the other. In the actual policy
debate, there have been two major strands of reform proposals of this
kind that deserve closer examination, namely (a) the introduction of
employment subsidies, and (b) the substitution of 'investment wages' for
'cash wages'. We shall subsequently discuss these non-exclusive policy
instruments with a particular view on whether they could help to prevent
or at least to alleviate the expected dualization tendencies.
(a) Employment Subsidies
The payment of public employment subsidies to firms in the East is the
most obvious and plausible means to preserve an East/West-labour cost
gap without a wage differentiation itself. Technically, it could be
arranged by reimbursing each firm in the East for a fixed percentage
(say, 30 per cent) of the per-hour contractual minimum wage that equals
the western level. By creating a positive wedge between the eastern
consumption wage and the eastern production wage, consumption wages
could be equalized between East and West which may minimize migration
incentives while at the same time eastern labour costs for firms could
See Section II of this paper.
Remember that we do not regard migration pressures as an important
rationale for East/West-wage equalization. However, to the extent that- 49 -
remain lower than the ones in the West. Assuming further that the
subsidies were financed in a lump-sum manner, their impact on the
labour market is analytically the same as that of an East/West-wage
differentiation of 30 per cent (measured as a share of the western wage)
because, in both cases, labour costs are 30 per cent lower in the East
than in the West.
There are basically three strands of arguments that have been made
against employment subsidies in eastern Germany. They focus on [i] the
impact on structural change, [ ii] various issues of practicability, and
[ iii] the moral hazard effect on future collective wage bargaining. All
these strands have been most forcefully brought forward by the German
Council of Economic Experts in its most recent reports. We shall briefly
discuss them in the subsequent paragraphs.
Ad [i]. As against interregional wage differentiation - and with the same
reasoning - it has been pointed out against employment subsidies that
they would steer the economy into a too labour intensive path of
structural change. In a similar vein, it has been argued that employment
subsidies would have the negative side effect of keeping an obsolete
capital stock from socialist times in operation and thus retard the process
of post-socialist transformation to market conditions.
As to the wrong-headed steering of structural change, all arguments in
favour of regional wage differentiation that have been advanced above
equally apply to an employment subsidy that successfully mimics the
required East/West-Wcige differentiation (which may be difficult due to
practical reasons to be dealt with under [iii] below). In fact, those
observers who make a case against employment subsidies on these
grounds usually start from the premise that there will be the same wage
level in West and East in the very long run so that any employment
they are, wage subsidies would be an appropriate instrument to remove
them.
5
7 See Sachverstandigenrat 1991/92, §§ 538-542 and 1992/93, § 297.
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subsidization in the East does almost by definition amount to an
interregional factor price distortion in a dynamic sense. As has been
59 argued above, we do not accept this premise, but rather take it as a
natural consequence of the vast unemployment gap between East and West
that there must be some such long-term differentiation. In the same
vein, we cannot reject the concept of employment subsidies on the
grounds that it distorts structural change; we rather regard it as an
appropriate correction of an otherwise distorted development towards 'too
capital-intensive' industries.
As
 yto the preservation of an obsolete capital stock, there are two lines
of defence for employment subsidies, a theoretical and an empirical one.
On theoretical grounds, it is hard to see why the mere physical age of a
capital stock should per se have any economic relevance for its
obsolescence: whenever an employment subsidy that mimics a market wage
differentiation prevents a part of the old capital stock from becoming
obsolete or at least gives it a chance to be profitably restructured by a
private investor, there is no point any more of categorizing this capital
stock as economically obsolete. After all, it can be put to a profitable
use again under quasi-market conditions, just as would happen in the
case of actual wage differentiation. In a way, it would make more sense
to regard both wage differentiation and the employment subsidy as means
to re-establish market conditions as far as possible, and thus to prevent
a premature capital obsolescence from coming about, because the true
standard of reference to evaluate the validity of a capital stock is not its
actual age or its physical appearance, but its chance to be run again
profitably under market conditions.
On empirical grounds, it is hard to see that the^ danger of preserving an
outdated capital stock is very important under the circumstances
nowadays prevailing in eastern Germany. Given the dramatic shrinkage
of industrial production and the vast number of plant closures which
have already taken place and which are to a large extent irreversible for
technical reasons, the introduction of an employment subsidy today would
See Section II. of this paper.- 51 -
hardly lead to retrogressive plant re-openings on a large scale. It is
more likely that its main impact would be a reorientation of business
plans for existing capacities that are currently in use and for future
investments. At any rate, it would not be inconceivable to limit
employment subsidization to those jobs that are created by new
investments after a certain date and thus explicitly exclude the 'old'
parts of the capital stock from receiving any aid at all. Legally, this
would mean that employment subsidies were treated just like the present
schemes of investment subsidies which also provide aid only to marginal
investments that modernize the old capital stock or create a new one.
Ad [ii]. There are basically three arguments which have been made
against employment subsidies on the grounds of practicability. First, it
has been argued that, once a system of investment aid is established as
at present for eastern Germany, it can hardly be replaced by a wage
subsidy scheme because that would involve a serious break of confidence
on the side of potential investors. This is why employment subsidies
would have to be introduced on top of investment aid, and that would be
unacceptable for obvious reasons. In our view, this argument is
unconvincing: if its logic were taken seriously, all political action that
involved a significant change in the type of aid scheme in whatever
direction would amount to a break of confidence, which is an absurd
consequence. Of course, any legal change would have to contain a clause
that all subsidy obligations resulting from investment decisions already
made would be met by the government. In practice, this could be
handled by fixing a deadline up to which all applications for investment
In this respect, it is very important to recognize the difference
between the focus of an early employment subsidy proposal made by
Akerlof et al. [1991] and the employment subsidy schemes we are
considering here. For Akerlof et al. [1991], the focus was on
preventing the wholesale breakdown of the 'Old' eastern German
industry, i.e. on keeping the old capital stock at a high degree of
utilization. In turn, our focus is on the role of East/West-wage
differentiation to steer the economy into a growth path that guarantees
full employment in the long run, with the employment subsidy being
simply a second-best means to mimic a wage differentiation on the
labour cost side.
6
1 See Sachverstandigenrat 1991/92, § 540.- 52 -
aid would be treated according to the status quo ante. In addition, one
might grant all firms that have made subsidised investments in the East
the option to pay back the present value of the investment aid received
and to choose instead an employment subsidy that will be paid ex post
for all jobs created and in the future for all jobs that survive up to the
envisaged termination date of the subsidy scheme. Thus, in effect, no
firm that has made an investment on the grounds of the old legislation,
will be put in a worse position by the legal change than the one that it
could anticipate at the time of its investment decision.
Second, it has been cirgued that employment subsidies will be 'extremely
costly' for the government because there will be many firms that make an
inframarginal use of them, i.e. cashing in the subsidy and producing
more or less at the same level as they would without it. These firms will
make additional profits from subsidization and drive up wages, thus
possibly leading to the 'perverse' outcome that the wage level in the East
would be higher than in the West. The implicit corollary to this line of
reasoning is that, even without subsidization, there will be 'enough'
investment in the East, meaning that a very large part of future
investment will take place anyway, be there wage subsidies or not. Of
course, this is a completely different starting-point of policy analysis
than the one we take on basis of what we have argued above, namely
that there is a very high likelihood of a dual economy emerging in the
East. Thus, the case against employment subsidies on the grounds of
inframarginal costs is simply one of different empirical premises, not of a
different view on practicality. In any case, it is unclear whether and, if
so, how the current investment aid schemes can avoid inf ramarginal
subsidization which appears to be a general problem of all aid systems:
why should a wage subsidy have an inherent tendency to lead to higher
inframarginal costs than an investment subsidy? A direct comparison
would only be possible if one had an empirical basis for deciding which
of the two types of schemes would lead to more inframarginal abuse at
the same present value of subsidies paid. Obviously, this question
6
2 See Sachverstandigenrat 1991/92, § 541.
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cannot be answered without a host of information on investment and
labour demand schedules at different points in time, which is simply not
available. Likewise, the danger of inframarginal firms driving up wages
in the East may just as well result from the lower capital costs per unit
of time which is the consequence of the investment aid granted at the
64
time of capital installation. Be that as it may, a 'perverse' outcome of
higher wages in the East than in the West could be avoided by paying
employment subsidies only for those workers who do receive no more
than the western-standard contractual minimum. Hence if, for competitive
reasons, a firm in the East paid higher wages than the western
contractual minimum to its labour or to some subset of its employed
workforce - say, to high-skilled engineers - then it would have to do so
at unsubsidized market conditions. Note that this option of 'punishing'
supercontractual payments by cutting off subsidies is not given in the
present system where eastern firms with (subsidized) capital costs could
well go ahead and drive up eastern wages beyond western levels.
Thirdly, it has been argued that any employment subsidy scheme has a
built-in tendency to perpetuate itself: once the subsidies are granted for
whatever period, powerful lobbies will demand their continuation - just
as regularly happened with subsidy programs for whatever sector of the
economy. Correct as this prediction may be, it is hard to recognize
any genuine difference in this respect between investment aid and
employment subsidies. Prima facie, such a difference may be found in the
fact that unlike employment subsidies, investment aid is paid out in one
stroke so that an investment aid program can be stopped at any time
64
Apparently, those arguing in favour of investment aid and against
wage subsidies on these grounds misinterpret an investment subsidy as
a once-for-all grant (say, like a tax rebate) that does not influence
the profitability of subsequent production. Properly accounted for as a
reduction of the user cost of cap>iteil in any period of production,
however, the investment aid has an effect on production profitability
that is completely analogous to the one of labour subsidization.
Theoretically, one could conceive of a present value of all future wage
subsidies accruing during the prospective period of subsidised
production, and thus end up with a once-for-all aid for job creation
that is analogous to the once-for-all aid for capital creation.
See again, Sachverstandigenrat 1991/92, § 541.- 54 -
with no fiscal obligations left over for the future. Again, this is a very
superficial difference with no clearcut political implications: just as
investment aid, so an employment subsidy program can be legally stopped
at any point in time. The present value of the remaining subsidies to be
paid out in meeting old obligations from the scheme are then no more
than the counterpart to the subsidies that would have to be paid out
immediately in an investment aid scheme. So, again, there is only an
accounting difference between the two schemes, not a genuine economic
one (apart, of course, from the fact that they subsidize different
factors): in both schemes, there will be a subsidization (in the economic
sense) of some factors of production for long after the deadline for
subsidy application.
In one respect, however, there is a genuine practical problem of timing
when granting wage subsidies: to be of any significant importance for
capital formation in the East, an employment subsidy would have to be
paid for a period that is roughly comparable to the economic life
expectancy of the capital stock that is complementary to the subsidised
labour input. For that matter, a period of 10-15 years may be a sensible
time horizon. Economically, there is not much difference in this respect
to the investment aid as has been argued above: after all, the 'time
horizon' of the present value of investment aid is also given by the life
expectancy of the capital stock created. Politically, however, things may
look differently: a government may refrain from making a fiscal
commitment over such long periods of time, because the commitment could
become rather unpopular if the rationale for the aid disappears faster
than originally expected. In this case, the once-for-all investment aid
has the advantage of being not fiscally visible anymore after the end- of
the program. E. g. , if a sudden non-anticipated improvement of the
labour market conditions in eastern Germany pushed the eastern
unemployment rate below the western average, any government which
then abolished the subsidy program, but had to meet the obligations from
Note that this is another point of departure of our analysis from the
one made by Akerlof et al. (1991) who focus on the preservation of the
old eastern capital stock, not the creation of a new one, and thus
restrict the envisaged wage subsidy to the short run.- 55 -
prior commitments for a rather long time to come, may find this
politically embarrassing. To some extent, this problem could be overcome
by simply making the payment of the subsidy conditional upon the
existence of a minimal East/West differential in unemployment rates and
possibly also making the degree of subsidization a function of the extent
of the East/West-unemployment gap: if that were done from the start of
the program, private investors would find themselves in basically the
same situation as in a free labour market where any anticipation of local
wage costs on the grounds of prevailing unemployment is always a
falsifiable prediction of future market developments.
All in all, the practical difficulties of an employment subsidy scheme may
be~ solvable, if only with a rather complex system of transition. Briefly
summarized, the skeleton of a valid labour subsidy legislation to replace
the many present investment aid schemes may consist of the following
ingredients:
- From day x in the future, all programs of investment aid for the East
will be stalled, and an employment subsidy of y per cent of the
contractual minimum wage will be paid for all newly created jobs in
eastern firms (measured as the net balance of jobs created on the
plant level since some reference point in time in the past).
- The new law will apply for a limited period of time - say,
5.years - with the option of being renewed thereafter; any subsidy
will be paid for a longer period - say, 15 years - and under the
explicit proviso that the unemployment rate in the East (or any specific
region of the East) will remain substantially - say, 5 percentage
points - above the western average.
- All firms that have invested in the East and have received investment
aid under the old legislation have the option: either to keep their aid
and renounce on any future employment subsidies, or to pay back the
present value of their investment aid received so far and to obtain the
right to employment subsidies from the time at which they have started
(or will start) production with the new capital equipment.
Note that, from an administrative standpoint, such a unified employment
subsidy scheme may hardly look complicated, but it is an open question
whether it would be any more complicated than the plethora of different
programs of investment aid and special credit facilities presently in- 56 -
use. To minimize bureaucratic costs, the payment of subsidies may best
be arranged as a tax rebate to be calculated and administered by the tax
authorities.
Ad [iii]. A prominent argument in the recent policy debate has been that
the introduction of employment subsidies would create a moral hazard
problem for future wage bargaining because it would be taken by unions
and employers' associations as a precedent of government's readiness to
neutralize the negative impact of wage rises on unemployment by a
compensatory provision of aid. It would thus create an incentive to opt
for} high wage levels in the future, which are not compatible with full
employment and which may even jeopardize the principal of autonomous
wage bargaining (Tarifautonomie) that forms the basis of industrial
relations in Germany.
In evaluating this common argument, one invariably ends up in very
speculative considerations simply because, so far in Germany, there have
not been any experiences with the application of employment subsidy
schemes, at least not on a larger scale. Under the particular
circumstances of present-day eastern Germany, however, it is hard to
For a survey, see, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung,
Institut fur Weltwirtschaft [1991b].
6
8 See, i.a. , Sachverstandigenrat 1991/92, §541.
Employment subsidies have been paid since the late 1980s for the
employment of long-term unemployed persons in the framework of a
special program to ease the integration of the long-term unemployed.
Obviously, this kind of program targeted ,- at a small group of
structually handicapped persons cannot give much empirical information
to predict what will happen to collective bargaining in the case of an
indiscriminate use of wage subsidies in a relatively large geographical
area like eastern Germany. Similarly, the experience with special
income tax reductions for the citizens of the formerly isolated city of
West Berlin, which can be interpreted as a somewhat camouflaged form
of an employment subsidy, is too small a base to draw conclusions
from. In a broader sense, Swedish economists (see Calmfors, Forslund
1990) have presented econometric evidence for Sweden that the heavy
use of labour market programs, which include the payment of
employment subsidies for structually handicapped persons, did
significantly contribute to upward wage pressure over the last three
decades.- 57 -
see why employment subsidies should really involve a serious moral
hazard problem over and above the one which may already exist due to
the present aid schemes. There are basically two reasons for this
judgement. First, if there ever was a unique historical event in post-war
German history, then it is German unification. In this sense, any
subsidy scheme that has been put up or might be put up in the wake of
unification carries a stamp of uniqueness. Sure enough, there have
already been many special rules and provisions applied to the territory
of the former German Democratic Republic that could have been viewed
as setting dangerous precedents, but were in fact widely perceived by
the public as being special measures to overcome the particular problem
of merging the two Germanies. It is not clear why an employment subsidy
scheme should make a qualitative difference in this respect.
Second, taking a somewhat broader view of the moral hazard problem
involved in wage bargaining, it is quite likely that alternative models of
subsidization such as investment aid schemes do signal more or less the
same message of a government responsibility for employment to the
bargaining parties as do wage subsidies. After all, both investment aid
and employment subsidies are aimed at raising the rate of return of
investment in eastern Germany that is too low because, at the given
locational conditions of post-socialist eastern Germany, the eastern wage
level is too high. Thus the difference between the two types of schemes-
appears to be one of subsidy technique, which does hardly touch upon
the general character of both investment aid and employment subsidies as
political means to compensate the impact of a wrong-headed wage policy.
In fact, the lack of interregional wage flexibility in western Germany all
over the last four decades is likely to be at least partly a consequence
of the readiness of governments to back up a regional egalitarianism of
collective bargaining by subsidising investment in structurally
disadvantaged regions.
Taking a bird's eye view of the different lines of critique of employment
subsidies, it is hard to avoid the speculative conclusion that it is more
the refusal to accept the economic case for a long-run labour cost
differentiation between the two Germanys on the grounds of a supposedly
wrong-headed structural change than matters of practicability or moral
hazard which provide the basic rationale for the critics' outlook. Or, to- 58 -
put it differently: if the critics were to accept the need for a long-term
wage differentiation along our lines and if they further assumed that this
wage differentiation would not be feasible due to some non-economic
constraints, then they might find themselves hard-pressed in the
direction of an employment subsidy scheme.
It is important to emphasize that we do not make a case for the actual
introduction of employment subsidies in Germany. We rather defend the
concept of employment subsidies against a critique that is in our view
analytically unjustified. On these grounds, employment subsidization is
better than investment aid, but - applied over a longer period of time -
both come down to a wholesale political ratification of a disasterous wage
policy, which will relieve the bargaining parties from the persistent
pressure to revise their agreements and weaken the residual mcirket
forces of outsider competition towards lowering the eastern wage level.
For this very recison, genuine wage differentiation appears to be clearly
preferable.
(ii) Investment Wages
In the context of the eastern German economic transformation it has been
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proposed to substitute investment wages for cash wages. In its core
idea, the proposal amounts to accepting East/West-equalization, but to
make collective bargaining allow for agreements on the plant level to pay
part of the collectively agreed minimum wage not in cash, but in terms of
a share in the capital of the respective company, with the share taking
whatever form is agreed upon. In effect, it would thus transform part of
the firms' wage liability into a labour owned capital stock; it would allow
the firm to reduce the burden of 'cash' labour, costs and thus ease the
restructuring process.
Note that this line of reasoning is different from the moral hazard
argument presented above which pointed to the general danger of
setting an ex ante precedent, not to the consequence of ex-post
ratification.
7
1 See Sievert (1992a, b), Fink (1992).- 59 -
Whatever the merits and demerits of this proposal of workers' capitalism,
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which are independent of the particular eastern German situation , the
proposal does not really tackle the core issues of the German labour
market, namely the need for an East/West-differentiation to raise the rate
of return on investment in the East. By its very logic, the proposal is a
mere substitution of two types of wage payments so that, for a potential
investor with a long-run time horizon, it would only be apt to raise the
expected return if, somehow, the present value of all wage payments is
reduced. However, this is very unlikely to be the case because workers
will only consent if they will be compensated for the deferred payment of
i the wage by receiving an appropriate rate of return on the investment,
wage over the cash wage. If they will consent without this compensation,
however, it comes down to a hidden form of East/West-wage
differentiation. In short, it is the differentiation that matters at the end
of the day, not the form in which this differentiation is presented. That
may in fact be left to the workers on the plant level who can decide
according to their own preferences whether they want to become
capitalists in their own firm and at what price. In effect, investment
wages have been proposed much more as a device to give existing
eastern firms a kind of temporary 'breathing space' from the cost side
rather than improving the general locational conditions for investment in
73 eastern Germany across the board. Hence, whether with or without
investment wages, the case for wage differentiation stands.
A similar line of reasoning would apply if some form of profit (and loss)
participation of labour would be proposed to help solving the eastern
German problems. Again, the core question would be whether such a
scheme helped not just to smooth the path of employment over the
72
Roughly speaking, one may see an advantage in the fact that
workers will have a long-term interest in a profitable operation of the
company; on the other hand, if the shares are non-tradable, the
workers may be stuck with an allocation of their savings, which is far
off their personal preferences, because - in addition to the employment
risk - they share in the risk of capital losses in just one firm.
Note that one of the main proponents of investment wages (Sievert
(1992a, b)) clearly recognizes the analytical difference between a device
to reduce the wage level, which his proposal is not, cind a device to
redistribute the wage burden over time.- 60 -
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business cycle, which it does under quite realistic assumptions , but
whether and to what extent it would help to raise the profitability of
investment in the East, i.e., roughly speaking, by how much it would
reduce the present value of future labour costs. In this respect,
however, the model is silent.
Of course, on a more tactical level of economic policy, any kind of
investment wage or labour profit participation in eastern Germany that
could help to overcome labour's resistance to a long-term wage
differentiation should be regarded as a sensible step forward. However,
xiit is hard to see why and how any such scheme could help in this
respect simply because unions have revealed their preferences by opting
for the fast wage equalization, and there has been no visible sign of
resistance against this on the plant level.
7
4 See Weitzman (1984, 1985, 1986) and Berthold (1990); for a general
critique of the Weitzman-model as a device to reduce unemployment
under the conditions of West Germany in the late 1980s, see Paque
(1990).- 61 -
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